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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL W. STRAND, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JACK CRANNEY, CRANNEY ENTERPRISES, 
INC. , and BONNIE CRANNEY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Cue No. 16118 
This was an action for the recovery from defendants of 802,000 shares of 
stock in Classic Mining Corporation, alleged to have been pledged as security 
for loans. Defendants counterclaimed that the stock was held by them as 
joint venturers with plaintiff, asking the court to wind up the joint venture 
affairs and distribute the assets. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Following a trial, without a jury, the court dismissed plaintiff's action, 
declared that plaintiff and defendants were joint venturers for the purpose of 
uwes tmg and trading in the stock. dissolved the joint venture, and directed 
J1stribution of the stock to plaintiff and defendants. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmance of the judgment of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents' Statement 
[In setting forth the facts as developed at the trial, respondents will refer to 
pages of the transcript of trial testimony (Tr.), rather than to pages of the 
record (R.), for the sake of consistency with the appellant's brief.] 
The appellant, Michael W. Strand, is self -employed ( Tr. 183). He makes 
his living by trading stocks, including those of Classic Mining Corporation, 
trying to affect their price (Tr. 184), and putting "deals" together for 
companies. During the times material to this proceeding, he was putting 
together some deals for Classic Mining Corporation (Tr. 184). The individual 
defendants and respondents, Jack Cranney and Bonnie Cranney, are district 
managers of Shaklee Company ( Tr. 229), and are also engaged in the 
business of making films and other aids to be used in selling products 
( Tr. 148) . They are the principals of Cranney Enterprises, Inc. , and own 
Cranney Distributing Company ( Tr. 12). They are not in the business of 
making loans ( Tr. 96), and were not familiar with stocks and trading 
(Tr. 116). 
Strand regarded Bonnie Cranney as an old friend, having known her 
before her marriage to Jack Cranney (Tr. 151). 
Jack Cranney, accompanied by Bonnie, first met Strand on about 
March .J,. 1977. at a Salt Lake City restaurant. at which time Strand was 
trying to put a deal together for Classic :'>lining· Corporation. in\·ol\·mg ura-
nium land. He told the Cranneys that he thought Classic was a ·:en· ::;cnC: 
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investment (Tr. 142). Jack Cranney then wrote tum out a check for $1,000 
and told him to invest it for him (Tr. 143). As a result, an 8CCIIWlt wu 
opened in Jack Cranney's name at Olsen and Company, brokers, ad 4,000 
shares of Classic Mining Corporation stock were purchaaed and placed Ill tile 
account, though the evidence is in contlic:t as to whether the purcbale wu 
made by Jack Cranney or someone else (Tr. 197, 144, 278). 
That early March social meeting led to a series of tranaactfona bet1Nea 
the Cranneys and Strand. Later that month, on about March 25, Strand 
found himself in need of additional funds, so he telephoned and aalted about 
the possibility of a loan. The Cranneys then loaned tum $20,000, for wbJch 
he gave them 10,000 shares of Classic Mining Corporation stock for maldnr 
the loan, and pledged another 190,000 shares to secure the loan (Tr. 14, 19, 
146-147). The loan was evidenced by a promissory note payable without 
interest in three installments, $5,000 on or before April 5, 1977, $5,000 on or 
before April 19, and $10,000 on or before May 3. Strand also executed a 
pledge agreement (Ex. 5 and 6) . 
The payment due on April 5 was not made, and before April 19 arrived, 
Strand was in need of money again. On April 18, the Cranneys advanced to 
Strand an additional $15,000 and received an interest bearing promissory note 
(Ex. 7), secured by 100,000 more shares of Classic Mining Corporation stock 
(Tr. 14, 19, 148-149). Up to this point, there are few material conflicts in 
the testimony, but there are substantial conflicts respecting the transactions 
that followed, which conflicts the trial court had to and did resolve. 
On the evening of May 3 Jack Cranney received a call from Strand to 
che effect that Strand and Galen Ross, an officer of and counsel for Classic 
\Itnmg Corporation. were coming to the Cranney home (Tr. 46). Ross was 
- 3 -
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coming along to corroborate Strand's statements about Classic Mining 
(Tr. 156). Cranney was told that they were in desperate need of money, 
that they hadn't been able to meet their prior commitments, and that if be 
would advance another $20,000, they would form a partnership and get bim 
involved in the venture, whereupon Ross negotiated for Strand concerning a 
partnership agreement with the Cranneys. Strand stated that both he and 
Ross had serious financial problems and neither one of them had any credit. 
They inquired about funds available to the Cranneys and whether their home 
had equity upon which Cranney might borrow (Tr. 47). Strand said that he 
would lose everything, and that he needed a partner in the business because 
they just didn't have the capitalization to continue what they were doing 
(Tr. 48). 
Ross stated that they wanted to change the nature of what had happened 
before, and the relationship with respect to the notes would change because 
Cranney was becoming a partner. Cranney was told that if he put up 
$20,000, raising to $56,000 the amount he had paid in. they would put 
800,000 shares of Classic Mining Corporation stock into the partnership 
(Tr. 50) He was told that he would have his $56,000 back by about June 15 
and that when his $56.000 had been returned, Strand would receive the next 
$56,000. and then the balance would be split down the middle. Strand also 
indicated that he would include Cranney in other ventures as the company 
became larger. and the parties discussed preparat10n of a wntten contract 
<. Tr. 51). Ross stated that he would prepare the contract. being wei: 
acquainted with ClassiC Ylinmg Corporatwn and wnh Strand's acti\"ltles · 
.Jack Cranney first saw the written jomt ~,~enture 1greement I, Ex 2:2, 
l'lay 20. At that time he had already gl\'en Stnnd the Jdd1tlcnal :S:::u.! UL· 
- ± -
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no stock had been put up. He had called several times (Tr. 52) to see it tbe 
contract would be prepared, then went to Ross's office where Rosa pulled out 
a contract and let Cranney read through it. Strand came in at about that 
same time, reached over Cranney's left shoulder and signed tbe acreement. 
Cranney did not sign at that time because the contract didn't state how much 
stock was involved, and specified that only Strand could sell tbe stock 
(Tr. 53), a provision that originated with Ross (Tr. 250). Otherwise, 
Cranney was in agreement with the form of the contract (Tr. 53, 58). In 
November or December, Cranney obtained a copy of the joint venture 
agreement (Ex. 8) from Ross, but this one did not have Strand's signature 
on it (Tr. 54). On May 3, according to Cranney's testimony, he had 
specified that he would like to be able to liquidate stock if they defaulted in 
the agreement ( Tr. 56), and this was discussed in general terms (Tr. 57). 
The partnership property was kept in what the parties called "the box", 
which was a safety deposit box maintained by Cranney. At the time Cranney 
went to the offices of Galen Ross on May 19 he was told by Ross or Strand 
that in order to bring the box up to the promised 800,000 shares it was 
necessary for Strand to recover some stock that he had at Olsen and 
Company (Tr. 23). He told Cranney that he, Strand, had $30,000 coming on 
:v!onday and that if Cranney would give him a check for $29,250. he would get 
the stock from Olsen and Company and deliver it to Cranney, so that 
Cr·anney could put the stock in the box and list it in the partnership 
agreement (Tr 24) . Cranney agreed to put up the $29.250 provided he 
.\'·~uld recei\·e a check made out by Ross at the same time which he would be 
Jt,Je to present on the following ;';londay (Tr 68) Ross agreed to this and 
·~td th3t h1s check would be good As it turned out, Cranney's $29.250 
- 5 -
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check was paid by his bank on the same day it was issued, a representative 
from Olsen and Company having driven to the bank and collected (Tr. 69), 
but the check from Ross was never honored (Tr. 70). At that time the 
Classic Mining Corporation stock was trading at 14 to 16 cents per share 
(Tr. 25). 
Thereafter, Cranney made some efforts to get his $29, Dee--back, but was 
not successful. Strand gave Cranney a check drawn on "Big Indian 
Associates" in the amount of $17,000, but it bounced (Tr. 16). On May 24, 
Cranney called Strand and asked about the $29,250 which he felt had been 
"expropriated" from him and was told that neither Strand nor Ross could come 
up with the money ( Tr. 59). He asked what they were going to do about it 
and whether something additional was going to be put into the partnership for 
the money. On May 31, having learned that Cranney had consulted an 
attorney, Strand brought an additional 200,000 shares to raise the total 
shares in the box to 954,000 ( Tr. 60), then added 80,000 shares of restricted 
stock borrowed from Ross (Tr. 170). 
In order to come up with some money, Strand put 125,000 shares in 
Cranney's account and made arrangements to sell it. It was sold, and 
Cranney received $20,000 from Olsen and Company (Tr. 171). There were 
25,000 shares left in the account which Cranney later took out and delivered 
to Strand (Tr. 172). 
The Cranneys' contributions to the joint venture had not yet ended In 
August. while the Cranneys were in Las Vegas. Nevada, they received a cal: 
from Strand who said he needed additional cash. They arranged to ha\'e 3 
Salt Lake City bank deliver hun a cashier's check in the amount of $12 · OOC 
( Tr. 37). Before ad\·ancmg the $12.000 Cranney had been told b\· Strar.~ 
- 6 -
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that $5,000 would go in as investment into a limited partnership, but tbja 
investment was never made. 
The testimony is that the Cranneys cave $1,000 to Strad oa Mai'Cb t 
(Tr. 13), $20,000 on March 25, $15,000 on April 18, $20,000 oa May t, .ad 
$12,000 on August 12; also that Cranney had paid $29,250 to OIMD md 
Company in the transaction ot May 19 (Tr. 14). The total paid by the 
Cranneys to or in behalt ot Strand was $97,250. 
Stock was deposited with Cranney and placed in the boz in the tollowinc 
amounts : 4, 000 shares on March 5, 1977, 200,000 on March 25, 100,000 on 
April 18, 450,000 on May 19, 200,000 on May 31, and 80,000 on July 4. In 
addition, 25,000 shares had been lett in the account established tor Cranney 
at Olsen and Company, making a total of 1,059,000 shares delivered, one way 
or another, to the Cranneys (Tr. 19). 
Of this stock, Cranney made some sales. On June 30 and July 15, 1977, 
he sold 44,000 shares for $10,017 (Tr. 17), at the end ot January 1978, he 
sold 10,000 shares for $5,435, and on or about February 1, sold 
$13,000 shares for $6,795 (Tr. 18). 
He returned some shares to Strand, 110,000 on August 9 and 55,000 on 
December 23. He also gave Strand the 25,000 shares that had been lett in 
his account at Olsen and Company. This left 802,000 shares in his possession 
at the time of trial. 
Although Strand took the position at the trial that there was no 
partnership, he had confirmed the existence of the partnership on several 
Kcasions. On October 22, 1977, the Cranneys met with Strand in an attempt 
:o g-et a better understanding of his view of the partnership. Strand was 
Jsked to state what they were partners in, because he had not produced the 
- 7 -
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documenta. At that time Strand said they were partners in the box, 
i.e. 1 the million shares 1 the oil well I royalties from the uranium 1 and oil 
royalties ( Tr. 64) . The Cranneys made notes during this conversation 
(!z. 9) 1 and both Jack and Bonnie Cranney testified to this conversation 
(Tr. 257). On May 251 19771 at the home of the Cranneys, Strand asked a 
friend of the Cranney a I Ruby M. Heaton, if she wanted to invest some 
stocks. At that time he talked about oil, and said that the partners were the 
Cranneys, Galen Ross, and himself ~ Tr. 267-268) . Shirley Jackson saw 
Strand many times in the Cranney home and would hear Strand say to Jack 
Cranney, "How's my partner?" (Tr. 269). She heard Strand mention that 
800,000 shares were in the partnership and that the two of them were each to 
take out $56,000 and then divide the balance ( Tr. 270). This was at the time 
Strand needed the $20,000 on about May 4 (Tr. 271). 
At the time of the trial, the Classic Mining Corporation stock was 
trading for about 80 cents per share, but during the times of the 
transactions in question the price was much lower. At the time of the May 4 
joint venture agreement the total amount of stock to be pledged would not 
have been worth much more than the $56, 000, according to Cranney 
(Tr. 129). Quotations of bid and asked prices in the Utah Enterprise showed 
the following: 
Date Bid Asked 
March 21, 1977 $ .28 $ 32 
April 18, 1977 .15 20 
May ·L 1977 .18 22 
May 11, 1977 18 22 
May 16. 1977 .15 16 
May 25, 1977 .17 21 
- 8 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(R. 284). The prices set forth in the Enterpriae are accurate enoup to pve 
a refiection of what a security did during a particular week (Tr. 225). 
Some of the documents involved in the transactioD contained ret••c•• 
to loans, but these were explained by Cranney to the satiafactloa of the trial 
court (Tr. 101-114). Notes were signed Cor the two loans prior to Ma7 4, 
but not Cor moneys received by Strand thereatter. 
Comments on Appellant's Statement 
Respondents are in agreement with some of appellant's StatemeDt of 
Facts, but it is inaccurate in many respects, and misleadinr in others. 
On page 5, it is stated that "Cor some unexplained reason," Cranney wu 
willing to advance additional moneys Cor a partnership although unwilling to 
lend any more money to Strand. The reason was explained. The stock to be 
put into the partnership was to be increased to 800,000 shares (Tr. SO); by 
June 15, Cranney would recoup $56,000; Strand promised to include Cranney 
in other ventures; and Classic Mining was "really going to go" (Tr. 51). 
Also on page 5, it is said that "the other participant in the meeting" 
denied that a partnership was agreed to. The reference is to Galen Ross, 
Strand's close associate, who went to the meeting to help Strand (Tr. 56), 
and whom the court could regard as working hand-in-glove with Strand. The 
other "other participant," Bonnie Cranney, confirmed the agreement 
( Tr 256-260), as did a visitor in the Cranney home (Tr. 270). 
On pages 6 and 7 of his brief, appellant sets out 13 "undisputed facts," 
each of wh1ch deserves comment. 
The voucher ~ ~ ~ $20,000 check on the April 18 (sic) meeting 
J1d not state ''partnersh1p contribution," but "Loan on stock 400,000 shares 
- 9 -
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of £!!!.!!£ Mining." But Cranney testified that he used the term "loan" 
loosely, not having had business training (Tr. 101); that there was never an 
occasion on which 400,000 shares changed hands, and his secretary might 
have put the notation on the voucher, since she sometimes "just codes things 
and does them" (Tr. 103). 
2. The defendant did not cancel the two previous promissory notes. 
True, but he did not attempt to enforce them, either. 
3. When Cranney delivered som~ stock back to Strand, the receipt 
~ ~ Strand referred to receiving collateral. The receipt (Ex. 17) 
reads: 
Received from Jack Cranney 100, 000 shares of classic 
stock against the "box" held by Jack for collateral and is 
to be returned as soon as possible. 
Mike Strand 
But Cranney did not write the receipt. He testified, at Tr. 112: 
I told Mr. Strand that I thought we're giving him that 
much stock that he should give us something back for it 
in the form of a hand receipt. And he wrote that one 
out and flipped it to me and walked out the door. 
4. The plaintiff himself was unaware of all the terms of the 
partnership or the extent of the partnership property. He knew the essential 
terms: 800,000 shares, $56,000 to him, then $56,000 to Strand, then split 
the balance--and so did Bonnie Cranney ( Tr 50-51, 256). He was not sure 
of what else was to go into the partnership because he was being 
double-talked by Strand. But the court agreed that there was no enforceable 
agreement as to property other than the Classic stock Strand was carefu; 
not to be too explicit about uranium and oil. 
- 10 -
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5. There ~ no agreement !! to when the 9!!!!£ Mintnr stock !!!!!!:~!! 
be sold, ~ who would decide when to sell. Enough to renerate $58,000 
would be sold by June 15, then Strand could sell enourh to obtain $58,000 
(Tr. 51), then the stock would be split (Tr. 51, 256), and either party could 
sell after June 15 ( Tr. 260) . 
6. The written agreement ~ unsatisfactory with Cranney becauae !! 
gave Strand authority to decide when to sell, and !! ~ "~ known" bow 
much stock would be in the partnership. The written agreement prepared by 
Ross differed from the oral agreement previously reached. The right of 
Cranney to liquidate stock had been discussed in general terms on May 3 
(Tr. 56), and the provision for Strand to control sales was Ross's idea when 
he drafted the contract (Tr. 250). It was known how much stock was 
involved--BOO, 000 shares--but Ross hadn't put it in the agreement. 
7. Cranney did not consider himself bound ~ Strand's transactions in 
the stock. The testimony referred to relates to a single transaction in which 
Strand wanted to sell all of the stock to a man named Barra, but would not 
tell Cranney any of the specifics (Tr. 136). Cranney would have felt bound 
by Strand's sale of his own half (Tr. 137). 
8. Cranney considered he had a right to sell without consulting 
unW he'd recouped the $56,000. The joint venture agreement 
prepared by Ross so provided (Ex. 8, Par. 2), and Cranney did not make 
any sales prior to June 15 ( Tr. 17), some time after he'd been misled into 
partmg with another $29,250. 
9 :'-lo Partnership books were set t,!£ This is true, but not 
- 11 -
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10. ~ !!!! ~ authority obtained to do business as ! partners~. 
There was no contention that any authority or license was needed. 
11. Only Cranney, !!2! Strand, had~ to the partnership properti. 
Not quite true. Cranney had the key to the box, but Strand was able to get 
stock on at least two occassions (Tr. 19-20). 
12. Cranney's notes "how ~ ~ partners?" and testimony that he ~ 
! partner in "one-half of Srand's action" shows the indefiniteness ~ the 
partnership agreement. The notes don't show that. Cranney testified that 
be wanted Strand to specify what they were partners in, because he had not 
produced the documents he had promised Cranney (Tr. 64), and they wanted 
to understand why Strand had changed his ideas (Tr. 263-264). 
13. The parties treated the transaction as ! loan and not ~ partnership. 
Although Strand had executed notes for the two loans in March and April, he 
did not do so thereafter. He thinks he may have signed a note for the 
$12,000 he obtained from Walker Bank in August, he was unable to produce 
any note (Tr. 195). The Cranneys' books were set up by Dennis Beal, a 
CPA, who assigned a code number to Strand, which never changed. The 
codes were placed on Cranney checks by the CPA or a secretary 
(Tr. 151-152). The endorsement on the $10,000 Nuepetco check given to 
Cranney by Strand was a self-serving statement placed on the check by 
Strand, without discussing it with Cranney ( Tr. 205), not long before suit 
was brought. Strand admitted that Cranney talked about taking 55.000 out oi 
Cranneys' side and 55,000 out of his side for $10,000 each (Tr. 205). 
The appellant's characterization of the $29.250 transaction in late :'>lal· 
(page 8). is not accurate. Cranney testlfied that the $29. ~50 was to bnM 
the box up to 800,000 shares. not to buy and sell stock l Tr ·~:3 1 The mum 
- 1:; -
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was requested by Strand, but Ross agreed to put up b.ia cbec:k··to be p-.s 
on the following Monday. 
Page 11 refers to sales of stock by Cranney without the CODMD.t, or 
even advice, of bis partner, Strand. But tb.ia was pendallible UDder the 
agreement, June 15 having come and gone (Tr. 51, Ez. 22). 
Other inaccuracies appear on pages 11 and 12, but they are repetitloua 
and already have been discussed. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE PARTIES WERE JOINT 
VENTURERS IN THE STOCK OF CLASSIC MINING CORPORATION. 
Appellant has conceived a paradigm of a joint venture agreement and, 
confusing the necessary with the desirable, argues that there couldn't have 
been a joint venture agreement because the parties did not follow Rabkin and 
Johnson's checklist. But the argument must fail. The courts simply have 
not required that degree of precision in order to find the existence of a joint 
venture. 
Although we have found no Utah cases establishing the specificity re-
quired for an enforceable joint venture agreement, other state and federal 
courts have spoken frequently. Replogle ~ Ray, 48 Cal. App. 2d 291, 119 
P 2d 980, 983 ( 1942), involved litigation between an attorney-at-law who was 
also an inventor, and an associate of his who furnished financial assistance. 
It was established without substantial dispute there was an agreement of joint 
•:enture by wh1ch the parties were to share in the proportions of two-thirds 
ro the mventor and one-third to the investor, but the other details of the 
- 13 -
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agreement relating to the scope and duration of the joint venture were issues 
in the litigation. In discussing the joint venture agreement, the California 
Court or Appeals said: 
Preliminarily, it may be stated that there was never any formal 
written agreement between the parties defining precisely their 
respective rights and duties in their joint venture. * * * As the 
details or the agreement of joint venture had not been reduced to 
writing, it was necessary for the trial court to determine the 
question o( the scope and duration of the joint venture from the 
above-mentioned testimony of Replogle [the inventor] and the 
inferences which might properly be drawn therefrom. Even the 
testimony of Replogle on the details of the arrangements between 
these men was not very definite and certain. He used such 
expressions as "the arrangement as near as I can define it was 
* * *", and "the arrangement was something like this * * *". But 
these considerations are not fatal to the finding of the existence of 
a joint venture with the necessary incidental findings of the scope 
and duration thereof. As was said in Andrews v. Bush, 109 Cal. 
App. 511, at p. 517, 293 P. 152, 154: "The law requires little 
formality in the creation of a joint adventure. Anderson v. Blair, 
202 Ala. 209, 80 So. 31, 35. Such an agreement is notinvalid 
because of indefiniteness in respect to its details. 33 C. J. 848. 
* * * In considering whether or not a relationship such as that of 
joint adventurers or partners has been created, the courts are 
guided, not only by the spoken or written words of the contracting 
parties, but also by their acts." 
In upholding the joint venture agreement, the court observed that since 
existence of the joint venture had been established, "it was necessary for the 
trial court to determine the scope and duration of that venture,'' which 1s 
somewhat the case here. There is compelling testimony by both of the 
Cranneys, supported by a draft version of a joint venture agreement and 
testimony of two visitors in the Cranney home. that the parties had agreed 
upon a joint \'enture involving a fifty-fifty di\'1SlOn of the profits after eacr. 
of them had recovered $56,000 from sale of stock m Class1c :>linin; 
Corporation. It was. therefore. the court's duty ro determme the scope 1n: 
duration of the joint venture and to rule upon the parues r·:ghts ill :he 
property of the ]Om t \·en ture. 
- : .j -
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In Dean Vincent, Inc. ~· Russell's Realty, Inc., 268 Ore. 456, 521 P.2d 
334, 338 (1974), one real estate broker claimed to be a joint venturer wtth 
another broker in the sale of real property. It was eatabliabed that the 
defendant, which had a listing on the property in question, bad told the 
plaintiff that it was a practice of the defendant to work "on a 50/50 co-op 
basis , all things being equal. " In other correspondence, also, &D even aplit 
was mentioned. As a result, the plaintiff produced some prospective buyers, 
but the sale was made, ultimately, by the defendant with little help from the 
plaintiff because of a personality conflict between the plaintiff's salesman and 
the purchaser. Because of this, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff was 
not entitled to an even split of the commission, but to some lesser amount. 
The defendants contended that there was no express agreement concerning 
commissions, and no joint venture. 
After noting that a joint adventure is never presumed and that the 
burden of establishing it is upon the party alleging it, that joint ventures 
need not be expressed but may be implied in whole or in part, and that 
equity would look through the entire transaction in order to promote justice, 
the Supreme Court of Oregon said: 
It has also been said that the usual rule of contract law to the 
effect that the terms of a contract must be definite and certain is 
enforced less vigorously in contracts of joint venture than in other 
types of contracts, particularly in cases in which the joint venture 
is not wholly executory, but has been wholly or partly executed 
* * * 
Thus. even though there has been no express agreement on 
the subject of dividing the profits of a JOint venture. the law may 
unply an agreement for equal diV1Sion of any profits .. Indeed. when 
two parties enter into a JOint venture the pnma faCie l.Ilference 15 
that they are equally interested and entitled to an equal share of 
em y profits. lil the absence of e•:idence to the contrary [ CttatJons 
omitted ] 
- 15 -
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The court held that the plaintiff real estate broker was entitled to share 
equally in the $50,000 commission earned on sale o! the ranch . 
Hore !.:_ George, 27 Wyo. 423, 200 P. 96, 18 A.L.R. 469, 474 (1921), 
involved the purchase and sale o! real property !or a profit, in connection 
with which the plaintiff claimed to be a joint venturer with the defendant who 
bad put up the money, purchased the property, and sold it. Evidence of the 
joint venture was found in a note written to Hoge, and testimony of 
discussions concerning purchase and sale of the property, but there was no 
express agreement with respect to the division of the profits or the sharing 
of losses. The plaintiff had in fact assisted defendant in the purchase of the 
property and in locating a purchaser to whom to sell it, but the defendant 
contended that the evidence was insufficient to establish a joint venture and 
that the trial court should have directed a verdict in his favor. In holding 
that there was a joint venture, the Wyoming Supreme Court said: 
We have stated the evidence sufficiently, we think, to show 
that there was substantial ground for a finding that the parties to 
this action intended to, and did, join their efforts in the venture of 
buying and reselling the Riverside ranch, and that they were to 
share the profits. To justify such a finding it was not necessary 
that the rights and duties of the parties to the contract of joint 
adventure should have been more particularly specified or defined. 
In Goss v. Lanin, 170 Iowa 57, 152 N. W. -!3, cited by this court in 
Reece v .-R~s, supra (25 Wyo. 91, 165 P. 449], it was said: 
"It is true that it is not necessary that there should be a specific, 
formal agreement to enter into a joint enterprise, or that the 
interests of the parties should be definitely settled in such 
agreement or that there should be a formal agreement as to the 
sharing in the profits. If there be a jomt enterprise proven. 
either by direct evidence of a mutual agreement to that end, or by 
proof of facts and circumstances from which it is made to appear 
that such enterprise was in fact entered into, the law fixes their 
rights." 
In Robie ':::'..:. Ofgant, 306 F 2d 656. 659 d Cir 1962). the parties were 
both experienced automobile dealers The plamtlff mforrned the defendant :: 
- 16 -
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an opportunity tor an automobile agency in San Juan, 
defendant would finance it. Alter defendant allegedly p~ to p,..... 
the financing plaintiff moved to San Juan and took steps to start the buata.e 
but defendant did not pertorm and plaintiff brought suit and obbiaed a 
verdict. On appeal defendant claUDed the evidence was too incletfDite u to 
terms to permit a finding that any contract was entered into, but tbe Court 
of Appeals affirmed, saying: 
* * * It is true that the details of the loans bad not been 
determined, nor the extent that defendant's capital part:ici.pation 
would be represented by stock and by indebtedness. But we thiDk 
that the jury could be permitted to find that since defendant's ciUef 
contribution was the financing, plaintiff's share of the net profits 
was to be computed before all financing charges. [Citation 
omitted.] Hence it was a matter of indifference whether or bow 
defendant divided his share, it any, between dividends and 
interest. Nor was the agreement illusory because no term was 
stated for plaintiff's employment. Even though there wu no 
specified term, having in mind that plaintiff was the finder and 
entrepreneur we think the jury could well find an implied 
undertaking that defendant's support, and plaintiff's participation, 
would last a reasonable length of time. * * * 
In Lord~ Pathe News, Inc., 97F.2d 508 (2 Cir. 1938), Judge Swan 
quoted from a leading Alabama case as follows: 
"It may be said, no doubt, of the great majority of contracts 
of joint adventure and of partnership, that they do not point out 
precisely what each party is to do under them. Such a provision is 
quite unusual, and, we should say, quite impossible in many cases. 
* * *" 
In his argument to this court, the appellant has pointed out certain 
matters that he believes were essential for a joint venture: the right to 
control, and the sharing of losses as well as profits. But these matters, like 
others, may be implied, or may be provided by legal principles found in the 
partnership act, which has been held to govern where the rights of the 
parties have not been made explicit in the joint venture agreement. 
- 17 -
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In Holtz v. United Plumbing and Heating Co. , Inc. , 49 Cal. 2d 501, 
319 P. 2d 617, 620 (1957), the Supreme Court of California said: 
It bas generally been recognized that in order to create a joint 
venture there must be an agreement between the parties under 
which they have a community of interest, that is, a joint interest, 
in a common business undertaking, an understanding as to the 
sharing of profits and losses, and a right of joint control. Such an 
agreement, however, need not be formal or definite in every detail 
relating to the respective rights and duties of the parties but may 
be implied as a reasonable deduction from their acts and 
declarations . * * * 
* * * The matter of losses apparently was never discussed, 
but, since this was a cost plus transaction, the chance of loss was 
rather remote. Moreover, an understanding as to the division of 
the profits ordinarily carries with it, in the absence of an express 
agreement to the contrary, an implied obligation to share losses in 
the same proportion. * * * 
Similarly holding that an express agreement with respect to the sharing 
of losses is not essential is Minute Maid ~ ~· United Foods, Inc .. 
291 F.2d 577 583 (5 Cir. 1961), and in Foster~· Keating, 120 Cal. App.2d 
435, 261 P. 2d 529, 539 (1953), the California Court of Appeals rejected a 
contention that there could be no joint venture where the parties have 
unequal control of operations, citing Sime ~ Malouf, 95 Cal. App. 2d 82. 
95-96, 212 P.2d 946, modified 213 P.2d 788 (1950). 
The appellant also has argued, at some length, that the partnership 
agreement was too uncertain because of the uncertainty with respect to the 
assets other than Classic Mining stock that would be in the joint venture 
This argument is answered by the fact that the trial court did not find a 
joint venture agreement with respect to the uranium and oil. which had beer. 
left indefinite and uncertain, but only with respect to the stock. which net 
only had been agreed upon but which had m fact been deli\·ered to the 
Cranneys. 
, ~ -
---
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In Lasry !.:_ Lederman, 147 Cal. App.2d 480, 305 P.2d 863, 667 (195'1), 
plaintiff relied upon an oral agreement whereby be and defendants bad fonaed 
a partnership or joint venture for the purpose of purcbaamr, ezploittnr. and 
reselling real property. The trial court's finding that the oral undentanc:UDr 
was too indefinite to create a joint venture was reversed on appeal. Tbe 
appellate court said: 
It is true that the agreement to which plaintiff testified wu 
indefinite with respect to the improvements that would be found 
desirable in order to place the property in satisfactory condition for 
occupancy. This, however, was a matter as to which agreement 
was not required before the property was purchased. It wu 
something that might have required a considerable amount of study 
and the consideration of the needs of prospective tenants. If these 
were matters as to which the parties did not disagree the fact that 
they did not agree or attempt to agree on a definite plan of 
improvement would not render incomplete the agreement to engage 
in a joint venture. The law requires little formality in the creation 
of a joint venture and the agreement is not invalid because it may 
be indefinite with respect to its detail. 
In its opinion the court noted that even though the parties may have reached 
no definite agreement for management of the property, it would not 
necessarily follow that they did not reach an agreement !£ acquire it. In the 
present case too, even though the court might find that the parties reached 
no definite agreement with respect to the acquisition of uranium property and 
oil wells, they did reach a definite agreement with respect to the acquisition 
and sale of Classic Mining Corporation's stock. There is nothing in the 
evidence to suggest that the venture in the stock was dependent upon the 
\'enture in the other property 
The appellant has cited a number of cases from this court which touch. 
margmally. upon joint ventures. but none of them suggests a different result 
m this case than that reached by the trial court. 
- 19 -
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Four of the cases are cited only for the proposition that joint ventures 
are in the nature of partnerships, subject to the law of partnership, and with 
this we bave no serious disagreement. 
McMillan v. Whitley, 38 Utah 452, 113 P. 1026 (1911) involves an 
ap-eement among six people to unite in the purchase and sale from time to 
time of the stock of the Daly West Mining Company, the court being called 
upon to determine the rights as between the various parties with respect to 
contributions under the agreement. The court was not called upon to give a 
name to the relationship between the various parties, and did not discuss the 
elements of a joint venture, but the agreement was upheld. 
Bates ~ Simpson, 121 Utah 165, 239 P. 2d 749 ( 1952), involved two used 
car dealers who operated separate businesses out of the same car lot. There 
was no agreement to share any profits, there was no sharing of profits, and 
the parties did not operate in any joint manner. There was no evidence that 
either of the parties acted or intended to act as joint venturers. The court 
recognized that a joint venture is in the nature of a partnership but could 
not find any facts indicating that the parties' contiguous but several 
operations were in any wise like a partnership. In the present case. there is 
believable evidence of an intention on the part of both Strand and the 
Cranneys to enter into a joint venture agreement for investment and sale oi 
the stock of Classic Mining Corporation. 
In Johanson Bros. Builders v. Board of Re\'iew. 118 Utah 384, 222 P Zd 
563 ( 1950). the question was whether some contractors were employers o:· 
young workmen or were partners with them. for purposes of liability io~ 
unemployment contributions The ev1dence established that while tho 
Johanson brothers entered in to arran gem en t s t~ \. wh1ch the1r •,,··~·d~men \\ere 
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share in the profits, the Johanson brothers operated the contractblr buaiD ... 
as their own. The entrepreneurs referred to the uaociatton u a 
"brotherhood," they entered into the contracts and received the _.,., 
controlled the bank account, owned the equipment and did aD of 11M 
contracting . The compensation was not on any fixed perceDtare bama, •d 
was determined by the group, based on experience and 10 forth. The JOQDC 
workmen did not consider themselves to be partners, believing that theJ nre 
just working for Johanson. The court determined that tor the purpo ... of 
the Employment Security Act the Johansons were not joint venturers with the 
workmen and were liable tor the statutory contributions. 
Vern Shutte and Sons !.:. Broadbent, 24 Utah 2d 415, 473 P.2d 885 
(1970), involved a cattle feeding contract under which one Fredrickaon wu to 
take possession of and feed, at his sole cost and expense, Broadbent's cattle, 
and as compensation was to receive 15 cents per pound gain in weight made 
by the cattle during the period in which he was feeding them. Frederickaon 
also fed cattle under similar arrangements for other people. There was no 
agreement to share profit as such, and when an action was bought against 
Broadbent for indebtedness incurred by Frederickson. the court properly 
held there was no joint venture. This court's opinion did indicate that an 
agreement, express or implied, for the sharing of profits is necessary, and 
that "the profit accruing must be joint and not several." The court didn't 
explain what that meant. and the appellant suggests that the profits were 
several. rather than joint. in the instant case. but it is difficult to see how 
he comes to this conclusion. The arrangement here is very different from 
that in the case cited After the two $56.000 sums were paid to Strand and 
~he Cranneys. the parties would each own one-half of the remaining securities 
;nd would share equaUy in the profits. which should be ··Joint"' enough 
- 21 -
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Busett ~ Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Utah 1974), contains some language, 
which the appellant regards as helpful, to the effect that the agreement must 
be such as to permit the court to infer that the parties intend to share losses 
as well as profits in order for the court to find a joint venture agreement. 
We submit that it is ill-advised dicta, inasmuch as the Uniform Partnership 
Act, which is frequently applied to joint venture agreements, provides that 
partners must "contribute toward the losses, whether capital or otherwise, 
sustained by the partnership according to his share in the profits." But this 
language is modified by the preface that the rights set out in the section are 
"subject to any agreement" between the partners. 48-1-15 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. An agreement that losses are not to be shared may be some 
evidence that the parties are not engaged in a joint venture, but it certainly 
should not be regarded as conclusive evidence of that fact. Bassett doesn't 
help the appellant in this case, anyway, because an agreement to share in the 
losses is implied. 
Other cases cited by the appellant do not help him. We agree with Paul 
v. North, 191 Kan. 163, 380 P.2d 421 (1963), that some form of agreement 1s 
necessary to establish a joint venture relationship, but there the trial court 
on disputed evidence found there was no agreement, whereas in the present 
case the trial court on disputed evidence found that there was an agreement 
West v. Soto. 85 Ariz. 255, 336 P.Zd 153 (1959), was an automobile 
---
accident case in which the two defendants were in an automobile for soc1i 
purposes. and the plaintlff was trying to recover damages from both 
doesnrt have much relevance to a business transaction such as in\~ol\?ed in ~'"'~ 
present case. 
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In his brief, appellant has made statement wbich simply are not bome 
out by the evidence, such as "there was no express joint venture." There ia 
abundant evidence that there was an express joint venture. What tbe 
appellant has done, as so many appellants do, is refer to the testimony of his 
own witnesses as it that testimony were gospel, ignoring contrary tutDBony. 
The Cranneys and two others testified that an oral qreement for a joiDt 
venture was made on May 4, 1977. Thereafter Galen Ross prepared a joiDt 
venture agreement as requested by both parties to it. In addition to tbe 
testimony as to the occurrences on May 4, 1977, Galen Rosa, Strand's 
associate, did prepare a joint venture agreement (Ex. 22), which contained a 
number of provisions which are customary in such agreements. The 
agreement was labeled "Joint Venture Agreement" and describes the venture 
as for the purpose of buying and selling stock. There is a provision tor sale 
upon mutual agreement but that if it is not sold by June 15 in sufficient 
quantity to permit repayment of Jack Cranney's $56,000, he might at his 
discretion sell sufficient stock to recapture that investment. It was provided 
that the physical possession of the stock would be held by Jack Cranney, 
that after repayment of the two $56, OOOs, the "balance shall jointly belong to 
the parties and shall become the capital assets of the partnership between the 
parties, to be shared in equal parts." It provided that proper books and 
records would be kept and that neither party would lend, spend or otherwise 
encumber the assets without the consent of the other party. There is a 
proqsion that additional money or stock might be added to the venture on 
such terms as mutually agreed upon. that the venture might be terminated by 
mutual agreement. and that upon termination the assets would be distributed 
.n cln equal basts "provtded that each party has received $56.000 from the 
:.,. "c·c-ed~ •.•t s:Jle •Jf th" c·enture stock " 
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Evidence introduced on the part of the defendants was to the effect that 
Mike Strand read the agreement and signed it in the presence of Jack 
Cranney, and that Jack Cranney read the agreement and was in agreement 
with its terms except for two matters: the number of shares--800, 000--to go 
into the venture, and inclusion of a provision that Mike Strand would be 
responsible for the selling and buying of stock. Thus there is evidence that 
the parties were in agreement upon all of the elements necessary to form a 
joint venture, even under the appellant's theories. 
It may be argued that the joint venture agreement represented by 
Exhibit 22 has no significance because it was not signed by both parties. 
But it is evidence of what they had in mind, and if they were agreed on what 
they had in mind, it didn't make any difference whether the joint venture 
agreement was signed or not. There is no evidence that the parties intended 
the written agreement to be a condition precedent to existence of the joint 
venture that had been agreed upon in the May 4 meeting. 
In General Realty Corporation :'!:. Douglas Lowell, Inc. , 233 Ore. 244. 
354 P.2d 306, 310 (1960), two real estate companies had negotiated a contract 
and agreed that a written contract would be prepared. A written contract 
was drawn, and was signed by one of the parties, but not by the other· 
With respect to the enforceability of the oral agreement entered into prior to 
preparation of the written con tract, the court said: 
Where parties agree to reduce their agreement to writing, the 
question arises as to whether their negotiations constitute a 
con tract. This question usually depends upon their intention, or, 
as it is sometimes expressed. upon whether they in tend the wntrng 
to be a condition precedent to the taking effect of the agreement. 
If the written draft is viewed by the parties merely as a convement 
memorial or record of their previous contract. its absence does not 
affect the binding force of the contract. tf. howe\·er. it is \'lewed 
as the consummation of the negot1ation. there 1s no contr·act until 
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the written draft is finally signed. Where the tenu of the CODt:nlet 
have in all respects been definitely understood md arreec1 upoD 
the failure subsequently to embody such terms in a wrt~ 
contract, as agreed, does not prevent the contract, where no 
statutory objection interposes, from being obliptory UPOD the 
parties. In other words, where all the substantial tenu of the 
con tract have been agreed on md there is notbinr lett tor future 
settlement, the tact alone that it was the understandinr that the 
contract should be formally drawn up md put in wrttmr doee DOt 
leave the transaction incomplete and without binding force, in the 
absence of a positive agreement that it should not be bindinl uta 
so reduced to writing and formally executed. 
(Accord: Restatement ot Contracts, § 26.) 
Inasmuch as the May 4 agreement, as expressed and as implied, in lilbt 
of the Partnership Act, was complete, changes made by Mr. Ross did not 
affect the enforceability of that agreement. 
II 
EVEN IF THE AGREEMENT DID NOT AMOUNT TO A JOINT VEN• 
TURE, STRAND AND THE CRANNEYS NEVERTHELESS BECAME 
CO-OWNERS OF THE STOCK, AND WERE BOUND BY THEIR 
AGREEMENTS RELATING TO IT. 
In many cases it makes a difference whether the parties are joint 
venturers rather than joint owners, principal and agent, or merely engaged 
in a common effort. This is true when third parties seek to impose liability 
on one or more of the parties, or where one ot them claims that the other 
occupies a fiduciary relationship. In those cases liability may depend upon 
whether or not the parties are joint venturers. 
In this case there was certainly evidence that in the meeting of May 4, 
1977. the parties had agreed that Strand and the Cranneys would become 
owners of 800, 000 shares of stock in Classic Mining Corporation, subject to 
the right of the Cranneys to recoup $56,000, and the right of Strand, 
:hereafter. to obtain a slffiilar amount, and that they would be co-owners 
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thereafter. There is also evidence that additional shares were put into the 
partnership because of Strand's having induced the Cranneys to put up, 
first, $29,500 for the acquisition of additional shares, and then an additional 
$12,000 needed by Strand. It can certainly be implied that when the 
additional funds were put up, that the amounts put up would be returned, 
and that when additional shares were put in, they would be divided in the 
same manner as the original shares, and this is just what the court did in its 
decree. 
If the agreement is there, or the court finds it is there, what difference 
does it make whether it was a joint venture or something else? It is possible 
to determine the rights of parties inter se without pasting labels. The rights 
of the parties would be the same, as it developed, whether they created a 
joint tenancy in the stock or a tenancy in common, and it is possible to 
create such tenancies in almost any kind of personal property. 
As stated in 20 Am.Jur. 2d, Co-tenancy and Joint Ownership, § 6: 
While it appears that joint tenancies were originally confined to 
interests in real property, it became settled at an early date that a 
tenancy of such character can exist in any kind of property that is 
susceptible of being possessed in severalty. Accordingly. it is now 
generally recognized that there can be a joint tenancy in almost any 
kind of personal property, whether it is corporeal, such as goods, 
wares, and merchandise, or incorporeal, such as insurance policies, 
bank accounts, building and loan association deposits, United States 
government bonds, corporation securities, and the equitable interest 
of a vendee under contract of purchase of real property. Further-
more, there may be a joint tenancy of a safe deposit box 
And in 20 Am.Jur. 2d, Co-tenancy and Joint Ownership, § 25. a similar view 
is expressed with respect to tenancy in common: 
A tenancy in common mav eXIst in e\·ery spec1es of property--real. 
personal, or mixed. a~d corporeal or incxporeal. Thus. for 
example, two or more persons may become tenants in common ,)! 
growing crops, of grain or cotton commingled m stc r:1>;-'" .. Jt li\·e-
stock: of a motor \'ehicle or a \·esse!. of chattels generally. ,Jf il 
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b:BDk accoun~; ot a lease; ot a mortgage; of miDinc, md pa md ot1 
ng~ts; o~ nparian water rights; ot a literary work; of a patent for 
an mvention; ot a church pew; and ot a cemetery lot. • • • 
Thus, 
there was, there is no reason why the agreement shouldn't be eatorc.blil bF 
one ot the parties against the others either aa a joint venture or u a 
co- tenancy in the stock under an agreement pursuant to wiW:b certatD ol t1ae 
stock is to be used tor repaying investments, and the stock ia thereafter to 
be divided on an equal basis. 
III 
STRAND HAD THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT HE WAS ENTITLED 
TO POSSESSION OF THE STOCK. . 
On page 15 of his brief, the appellant asserts that the burden ot proof 
was upon the Cranneys to establish that a joint venture existed, which ia 
true. But from that he jumps to the conclusion that it the joint venture is 
not proven he is entitled to return of the stock, failing to give any 
consideration to the burden he bears in attempting to gain possession and 
control of stock that is in possession of the Cranneys. 
In Srdar ~. Vrooman, 483 P. 2d 976 (Colo. App. 1971), an action was 
instituted to recover savings account funds and shares o! stock that had been 
transferred to the defendant by the plaintiff's predecessor in interest. The 
action was begun and tried on the theory that the transfers of such funds 
and stock were procured through fraud and unlawful taking on the part o! 
the defendant. A jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and on appeal 
the plaintiffs contended that the jury verdict could not stand because there 
11as no evidence that the transfers were made to defendant in exchange for a 
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valid consideration or in discharge of an implied contract for her services. 
In rejecting this notion, the court said: 
As stated, this action was brought to nullify the transfers to 
defendant on the theory of fraud and unlawful taking. The burden 
of proving the elements of those assertions rested with plaintiffs. 
[Citation omitted. 1 The transfers to the defendant were completed, 
and there was no burden upon her to plead affirmatively and prove 
consideration or a contractual basis for them. The trial court 
properly restricted the determination of the case to the issues 
raised by the plaintiffs. 
The present action is essentially a replevin action. In Henderson v. 
Lacey, 347 P.2d 1020 (Okla. 1959), the court said: 
* * * In a replevin action the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove 
that he is the owner of the property in question or has a special 
interest therein; that he is entitled to the immediate possession of 
the same; that the property is in the possession or under the con-
trol of the defendant; and that the defendant has wrongfully 
detained the same from the plain tiff. 
In Crystal Recreation, Inc. , ~. Seattle Association of Creditmen, 3-l 
Wash. 2d 553, 209 P. 2d 358, 361 (1949), the court said: 
The plaintiff in a replevin action must prove its title and right to 
possession in order to be successful in the action. The plaintiff 
can only succeed on the strength of its own title and right to 
possession, irrespective of the title or right to possession of the 
defendant. 
The above cases are in accord with the general rule as stated in 66 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Replevin, § 98: 
The plaintiff in an action of replevin, like every other action, has 
the burden of proving his case by the preponderance or greater 
weight of the evidence. Thus, the burden is upon him to show 
that at the time of the commencement of the action he was the 
owner of the property sought to be replevied. that he is entitled to 
the immediate possession of the property. and that the defendant 
wrongfully detains it. The burden does not shift where the answer 
pleads property in the defendant. * * * 
See also. Her! v State Bank of Parsons. 195 Kan 35. ~03 p :2d 
-
ll 
(1965). and Bill Dreiling :'-lotor Com pam· \' St Paul Flrl· .md \]ar~c 
Insurance Com2an \'. ~fl Colo App 313. ~ -., ,_ p :2j 15.;. :) l ·-. 
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According to the above authorities, the appellant C&DDOt ret fi"CCa ....... 
be is to where he wants to be simply by showing that the CraDD8JI bad a.. 
burden of proof on their counterclaim. 
bad been entered into which precluded the plaintiff tram rec:overmc the ltiOck 
from the Cranneys and concluded that the plaintiff's actioll apjlllt tbe 
defendants should be dismissed, with prejudice and on the aeritl••that ia, 
the action of replevin to recover the stock. The only relief the pllmtltf wu 
entitled to was that asked for in the counterclaim ot the Cranneys, that ia, 
that the joint venture's affairs be wound up and that the plaintiff and 
defendants be distributed their respective shares of the assets. Certainly 
the evidence does not establish that Strand was entitled to immediate posses-
sion of the stock of Classic Mining Corporation. 
(Respondents recognize that the point is academic, their burden of proof 
having been easily carried.) 
CONCLUSION 
From the evidence adduced, it is fairly inferrable that a plan to pluck 
pigeons failed. A promoter who was making deals for Classic Mining Corpo-
ration, and working to affect the price of its stock, needed capital to accom-
plish his goals. The Cranneys, business people who knew little about stocks 
and trading, were thought to have money. If the transactions were properly 
cast, and Strand was the one who cast them, he would have two options: If 
the stock increased substantially in value, the Cranneys would be lenders, 
but if the bottom fell out, they would be investors. 
But things didn't quite work out, because Strand talked of the joint 
•:enture and its terms, and about his partner, before too many people, and 
'"'cause the law holds him to his bargain despite the absence of many details· 
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On the basis of the evidence, much of it disputed, much of it dependent 
upon credibility, the court properly found a joint venture, meticulously 
divided the assets and achieved a just result. The judgment should be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMlTTED, 
B4R~ ROE~ FOWLER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the )'l. t( day of August, 1979, I served the 
attached Brief of Respondents upon Richard J. Leedy, Esq. , attorney for 
appellant, by depositing copies thereof in the United States mails, postage 
prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Richard J. Leedy, Esq. 
610 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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